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Abstract 
Deleuze’s work exists in a “minor” tradition of philosophy, alongside Giordano Bruno and 
F.W.J. Schelling, that entwines metaphysics with rhetoric and affect. Philosophy is a 
pragmatic art of choosing the most effective and affective means of concept-construction. We 
demonstrate these claims by situating Deleuze’s assertion “I am a pure metaphysican” in a 
genealogy of metaphysical pragmatism leading from Bruno and through Schelling. At stake 
in all three thinkers’ work is metaphilosophical reflection on the specific deployments of 
sense necessary to make philosophy happen. 
 
 
Introduction: The Becoming-Archaic of Metaphysics 
In his monumental, yet perpetually neglected account of the origins of human thought, 
Giambattista Vico makes a claim about the nature of metaphysics that can serve as a 
surprising cipher for the tradition in which Deleuze, F.W.J. Schelling, and Giordano Bruno 
must all be situated. Vico writes that “the Queen of the Sciences, metaphysics, began when 
men began to think in human fashion, and not when philosophers began to reflect on human 
ideas.”1 Metaphysics and becoming-human are here fatefully interlinked, such that the role of 
the metaphysician (no matter in what era she lives) is identified with a continual process of 
anthropogenesis—traversing and retraversing the human-inhuman divide in a conceptual 
rhythm. The metaphysician must situate herself on the boundary of the very becoming-human 
of thought—and it is precisely here that metaphysics is synonymous with (and not opposed 
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to) critique. Thought searches out its grounds, the conditions of possibility which first 
constituted it. Speculation is critique at the moment that philosophy becomes archaic.
2
 
 How does thought achieve this? How, that is, does the philosopher descend into these 
archaic depths to re-inhabit the inhuman/human boundary? And, what is more, how can one 
assess how successfully she does so? The answer that not only Vico but also Bruno, Schelling 
and Deleuze give is that thought must transform and mutate itself into that archaic condition. 
It is a case of a rhythmic intensification and de-intensification of thinking. We will consider 
Bruno, Schelling and Deleuze's reflections on this problem shortly; however, Vico puts it 
thus, 
 
Now rational metaphysics teaches us that man becomes all things through 
understanding... But with perhaps greater truth, this imaginative metaphysics [of the 
first humans] shows that man becomes all things by not understanding... When he 
does not understand [all things], he makes them out of himself and, by transforming 
himself, becomes them.
3
 
 
Construction, self-transformation and metaphysics are intertwined—and this intertwining 
(along with the added complications that the concepts of affect and rhetoric bring) forms the 
topic for what follows. What is at stake is the art of the metaphysician: the strategies, skills 
and practices that allows her to think the becoming-thought of thought. 
 On Vico’s account, then, metaphysics began not in rational reflection, but when the 
gigantic, feral creatures who were our ancestors began to imagine themselves in relation to 
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the powerful forces of the awful nature around them. Vico writes, 
 
For providence ordained that the people with gigantic proportions and the greatest 
strength would wander the mountain heights like beasts with natural strength. Then, 
on hearing the first thunder after the universal flood, they entered the earth in its 
mountain caves, and subjected themselves to the superior force which they imagined 
as Jupiter. All their pride and ferocity was converted to astonishment, and they 
humbled themselves before this divinity.
4
 
 
Metaphysics begins not reflectively, but poetically. It also begins in a kind of piety. Taking 
the awesome power of the lightening as an omen, our pagan ancestors crudely construe or 
“divine” its meaning and import as an auspice, a sign of an obscure and yet invested 
authority. Insofar as this piety issues immediately in a metaphorical conjecture, such 
conjecture is the first and last metaphysical gesture:  metaphysics begins as an imaginative 
conjecture as to the ultimate nature of power (and power of nature).  Vico simultaneously 
links divination (along with marriages and burial rites) to the essence of humanity:  to be 
human is to construe, and to conjecture, from the known to the unknown.  To be human, 
contemporary prejudices notwithstanding, is to be metaphysical. 
But paradoxically, to be or become-metaphysical is not precisely to become rational, 
and humanity for Vico is not defined as a rational animal.  In the concluding pages of the New 
Science, Vico avers that the ultimate ground of all human conjecture lies in the affects—
specifically in affects of wonder, veneration, and desire.
5
 Because initial (and final) 
conjecture emerges from these affects, without the affects, we do not have metaphysics. And 
without such a metaphysics, conversely, we do not have humanity as we know it. There is 
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thus an immediately ethical dimension to poetic and primordial metaphysics: 
 
In their fear and reverence for such divine gods, [our ancestors] found themselves torn 
between the powerful restraints of fearful superstitions and the sharp goading of 
bestial lust, passions which must have been extremely violent in such people. Terrified 
by the aspect of the heavens, they checked their urge to sexual intercourse, and instead 
subjected their lustful impulses to a conscious effort. In this way, they began to enjoy 
human liberty, which consists in restraining the impulses of physical desire, and 
giving them a new direction.
6
 
 
Affect is central to the emergence of metaphysics, and so a genuinely critical philosophy—
one attuned to its own conditions of possibility—will therefore recover, repeat and redeploy 
affect, as such. This is, of course, a trope as old as the Symposium, but notice how Vico 
perverts the ascent which the desirous are meant to follow. It is no longer the case that desire 
withdraws us from bodily lusts in the name of intellectual visions; rather, desire (and affect 
generally) oscillates unstably between “the sharp goading of bestial lust” and abasement 
before the “fearful superstitions” of divine law. Desire deranges, fractures and degrades. And 
metaphysics is born out of such tension—not only for Vico, but also for Bruno, Schelling and 
Deleuze. 
 This linking of metaphysics to the affects (and thus to ethics) is a particularly 
important theme in Deleuze’s thought. In his book on Nietzsche, Deleuze avers that we have 
the truths we deserve based on the hour we watch over and the element we frequent.
7
 In 
Difference and Repetition, Nietzsche’s conception of eternal return is read as a test of whether 
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one has the strength (viz. affective capacity) to endure the world as it is.
8
 Metaphysics begins 
not in an emendation of the intellect, but an emendation of the affects. The potential of sense 
(that is, meaning and value) derives from alterations and transformations at the affective 
level. Metaphysics is, for Deleuze, grounded in the possibility of a “physics of sense,” a 
genealogical and topological account of affective difference. Following Bergson, Whitehead, 
and Spinoza, Deleuze insists on understanding metaphysical capacity on the same plane of 
immanence as all other affective-based capacities (such as those of the tic or those of a war 
machine). But this is not the only tradition of affective immanence Deleuze inhabits: both 
Schelling and Bruno before him took up something like this position, and we must situate 
Deleuze in this line in order to broaden the scope of some of the most difficult questions 
about Deleuze’s system. Such is the task of this paper. What emerges from it is a “minor” 
tradition that invites us to ask an extremely difficult metaphilosophical question: what criteria 
can be used to evaluate metaphysical positions, given that such positions have an ultimate 
ground (or unground) not in reason but in the affects?  
We bring Deleuze together with Bruno and Schelling, first of all, because they 
engage, cite and repeat each other. Deleuze refers implicitly but approvingly to Bruno in 
Expressionism in Philosophy
9
; he speaks in hints and riddles of Schelling's importance to him 
in Difference and Repetition.
10
 Schelling likewise makes Bruno “the patron saint of his 
philosophy”.11 However, beyond such citation (and neither Deleuze nor Schelling were 
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particularly fulsome in their acknowledgement of sources) there is more significantly a 
conceptual structure which binds these three thinkers together in one minor tradition. They all 
foreground the role of the philosopher in constituting metaphysics; they all enumerate a series 
of practices and transformations for the philosopher to be initiated into metaphysics; in sum, 
they all (despite the many divergences and disagreements that exist between them) chart a 
physics of the sense of metaphysics. 
 
 
Part One: The Figure of the Pure Metaphysician 
In 1981, Deleuze confessed to Arnaud Villani, “I feel I am a pure metaphysician.”12 
One way of characterising our task over the next few pages is a commentary on this 
affirmation—to explicate and unfold what a “pure metaphysics” consists in. However, from 
the beginning we must be clear that this is a commentary and not the commentary. For 
Villani, Deleuze's outing of himself as a pure metaphysician is intended as a judgment on 
“the difficulty of doing justice to complexity, to multiplicity, to singularity”, a judgment on 
the fundamental “decision” that gives rise to “certain modes of thinking” (for with such 
decision comes “loss”).13 Indeed, we must acknowledge that at the same time as Deleuze's 
comments on pure metaphysics gives rise to our analysis of the becoming-archaic of 
philosophy, they also put it into question. This is, of course, implicit in our labelling the 
Bruno-Schelling-Deleuze trajectory a minor tradition.
14
 
 However, with that qualification in mind, we pose the question: in what does pure 
metaphysics consist? It consists above all, as Vico made clear, in an affective metaphysics—a 
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thinking in which affects are liberated from regulation. Where Kant imposes the discipline of 
pure reason, Deleuze insists on the indiscipline of reason—a reason that is no longer pure, but 
mutates and contaminates itself in adventure. The purity of metaphysics is guaranteed by the 
impurity of reason. In short, pure metaphysics is attained once we stop predetermining in 
advance what reason can do (and to this extent, of course, the very question, “in what does 
pure metaphysics consist?” is inaccurate): once reason is no longer essentially X or 
essentially Y, once there is no longer even a felt need to describe what reason is (as if it were 
something given), then it can become what it wants. This liberation—an emancipatory feeling 
of constructive power—is the vector along which pure metaphysics is generated. 
Evidence for such a description of Deleuzian metaphysics emerges in his “Letter to a 
Harsh Critic”, which (as Deleuze insists in the same Villani interview15) is to be taken as the 
definitive account of his development. One of Deleuze’s critics had accused him of merely 
fawning over the intense experiences and experimental voyages of others—“vaguely 
savouring their transports,” as Deleuze restates the charge.16  Deleuze’s response is profound. 
Rather than forswear his appreciation for the adventures of others, he points rather to his own 
experience, an experience he insists can only be spoken of indirectly, even falsely.  
 
But what do you know about me, given that I believe in secrecy, that is, in the power 
of falsity, rather than in representing things in a way that manifests a lamentable faith 
in accuracy and truth? If I stick where I am, if I don't travel around, like anyone else I 
make my inner journeys that I can only measure by my emotions, and express very 
obliquely and circuitously in what I write.
17
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We know that Deleuze, like Kant and like Proust, was no great traveller. Apparently his 
journey to the U.S. with Guattari was a miserable one (even the picture of Deleuze on the 
beach in Big Sur figures him playing morosely with the sand).
18
 And yet Deleuze explicitly 
says here that his writing is a testament to emotional journeys, to affective states and 
experiences that cannot be the subject of direct representation. Given that Deleuze calls 
himself a “pure metaphysician,” what can be made of a metaphysician who disavows the 
representational power of concepts in favor of an indirect discourse on his experiences? Is the 
disavowal itself ironic? False? 
 In the first place, Deleuze disavows that he is speaking from a position of “privileged” 
experience. In fact, he explicitly says there is something “bad and reactionary” about making 
arguments from such a position. He continues, 
  
The question's nothing to do with the character of this or that exclusive group, it’s to 
do with the transversal relations that ensure that any effects produced in some 
particular way (through homosexuality, drugs, and so on) can always be produced by 
other means. . . It’s not a question of being this or that sort of human, but of becoming 
inhuman, of a universal animal becoming—not seeing yourself as some dumb animal, 
but unraveling your body's human organization, exploring this or that zone of bodily 
intensity, with everyone discovering their own particular zones, and the groups, 
populations, species that inhabit them.
19
 
 
Presumably what one discovers in such experiments is a properly universal, rather than 
exclusive, domain of experience: the “Planomenon,” the Unknown Natures that traverse 
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individual organisms, species, groups, even societies.
20
 We might risk the proposition that 
what Deleuze means by metaphysical language is the language of what, at the most abstract 
level, “can always be produced by other means.” 
One of the most important things to notice in the above passage is the conjunction of 
zones and lines. On the one hand, everyone has her “zone,” but on the other hand, there are 
transversal lines that cross the zones. Presumably the language of metaphysics, for Deleuze, 
is the language of those lines. But the criteria of the adequacy of the names of the lines is not 
whether they accurately or correctly represent what the lines are, but the degree to which they 
encourage, relay, or continue what the lines may be. That is to say, the critical question 
becomes, how do names such as “rhizome,” “becoming-animal,” “fold,” “difference-in-
itself,” “metaphysical surface,” bear witness to the specific singularity of zones and provoke 
more of the zones, groups, and populations that may yet become? What do such names do? It 
is this constructivism, or even pragmatism, in Deleuze's use of metaphysical language to 
which we return in the second half of the paper: words make metaphysics for Deleuze. And, 
to this extent, the “physics of sense” denotes the mapping of the specific rhetorical strategies 
that generate metaphysical entities. 
Somehow metaphysical language, to be both referential and pragmatic, must have an 
irreducibly rhetorical dimension. There is a rhetoric specific to metaphysics. Since being is 
becoming, and since for Deleuze the becoming of language and concepts is not different in 
kind from the becoming of events, metaphysical language does not so much identify as 
provoke or continue events.  At stake in metaphysics, therefore, is a knot between three terms: 
event, rhetoric and affect. The conscious manipulation of this knot and so the perpetual 
reconfiguration of metaphysics in relation to events, affects, and rhetoric is, above all, what 
marks out this minor tradition of metaphysics, the one in which Bruno, Schelling and Deleuze 
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participate. 
 
Part Two: Philosophical Frenzies 
If, then, the above provides a broad account of the framework of pure metaphysics, 
what is required, in addition, is an enumeration of the various, specific practices of mutation 
by which it is constituted. One such practice is, as we have just delineated, rhetorical—and 
we return to it later in the paper. However, even more fundamental is a practice which (in 
divergent forms) governs all metaphysics undertaken in this tradition. Deleuze's version of it 
is presented in the closing pages of Bergsonism: 
 
It could be said that man is capable of rediscovering all the levels, all the degrees of 
expansion and contraction that coexist in the virtual Whole. As if he were capable of 
all the frenzies and brought about in himself successively everything that, elsewhere, 
can only be embodied in different species.
21
 
 
Deleuze here repeats an old image: what exists explicate in humanity exists complicate in 
nature, or man is a microcosm of the All. It is an image that has been redeployed for 
metaphilosophical purposes in modernity, where it is the metaphysician above all who is able 
to rediscover the All, to express every frenzy in herself. According to Bruno, for example, 
this is the ideal of the omniformis: a philosopher who transforms herself perpetually into 
minerals, animals and gods. It is an ideal of the metaphysician as a sage who, by continually 
becoming-other, attains a knowledge of the whole.
22
 This ideal continues into German 
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Idealism, where Schelling too idealises the philosopher as a figure able to repeat nature 
within herself. The above passage from Bergsonism situates Deleuze in a specific tradition of 
philosophy that passes through Bruno and Schelling. It is a tradition of pure metaphysics 
which cultivates and constructs frenzies (affective reason become productive) in order to 
repeat nature's own frenzies. 
Bruno was perhaps the first modern philosopher to be explicit about the connection 
between the cultivation of frenzies and metaphysical insight. Whereas there had been a long 
Neo-Platonic tradition of ecstasy, Bruno’s notion of frenzy hints at a to-ing and fro-ing within 
the world, an incessant alternation that is not quite the same as Neo-Platonic notions of 
elevation toward the One. Given Deleuze’s cryptic but admiring mentions of Bruno, and his 
somewhat more substantial if equally cryptic nods to Bruno’s ancestor Nicholas of Cusa23, it 
is worth more than simply mentioning Bruno as a kind of dark precursor to Deleuze (as well 
as to Schelling) in terms of such a metaphysics of affects.  
 Heroic Frenzies establishes the centrality of frenzy to Nolan metaphysics most firmly. 
The metaphysician becomes “a furious lover”24 who is urged on to wilder deliberations by 
desire “decked in divers forms.”25 Affect and cognition become indistinguishable to the 
extent that the guiding imperative to metaphysical practice becomes: “Render your affect so 
fervent!”26 The key to Bruno's metaphysical reconstitution of frenzy is his theory of bonding. 
Relationships (whether physical, mental, metaphysical or affective) are all collapsed into a 
theory of different types of bonds or “different kinds of knots.”27 The subject of knowing is 
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knotted in a specific way to the object of knowing, just as the lover is knotted in a very 
similar way to the beloved—and such similarity is precisely what the image of the 
metaphysician as “furious lover” represents. Philosophical bonds are creations of love: they 
are attractive or “heroic bonds”28 which draw the object to the subject. The task of the 
philosopher, according to Bruno, is therefore to, first, understand and enumerate all the 
particular forms of bonding in existence (and this is what Bruno himself does in A General 
Account of Bonding and On Magic) and, second, to exploit this knowledge in order to 
manipulate bonds in the name of knowledge—in other words, to turn bonds that repel or keep 
the object at a distance into attractive bonds. The task of the metaphysician, here, is to make 
the world fall in love. 
 Thus, as Bruno writes, “The inclinations of all bonds can be actuated by a skilful 
effort.”29 Metaphysics is an art: it is the art of knowing what is the appropriate form of the 
attractive bond to be deployed in a certain situation. What will become increasingly crucial as 
our exposition of Bruno continues is his Aristotelian contention that “what is appropriate” is 
context-sensitive. One cannot predict in advance the type of bond which will reap knowledge: 
a good metaphysician is not she who continues to repeat the same method no matter what, but 
she who responds to the specific, concrete circumstances in which knowledge is to be 
gained.
30
 The cultivation of bonds of attraction between the metaphysician and the object of 
knowledge is subject to finesse, a kind of pragmatism that we will see more clearly in Bruno's 
account of metaphysical language.  
 What is more, this metaphysical practice is the very definition of magic for Bruno. 
The magician “manipulat[es] active and passive powers”31, maintaining bonds between 
objects and also creating new ones. In particular, the magician, like the metaphysician, relies 
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on “the use of words, chants, calculations of numbers and times, images, figures, symbols, 
characters or letters”32 to achieve this. Indeed, the minor tradition of Bruno, Schelling and 
Deleuze we identify in this paper could be helpfully characterised as a tradition of magical 
metaphysics, to the extent that the role of the metaphysician is to produce new relations 
between objects and, indeed, to do so (as we shall see) by transforming her own self-relation 
to the world. For Bruno, Schelling and Deleuze, the metaphysician is also a magician. 
 Bruno's writings, one must conclude, emphasise the role of the philosopher. In 
opposition to a formalist current of metaphysical thought which erases the role of the subject 
of knowing in favour of a pure, subject-less inscription of reality, Bruno envisages the 
behaviour of the philosopher as a key ingredient in the constitution of metaphysical reality. 
No longer, therefore, is the Platonic text a book on which reality writes itself, instead, Bruno 
writes, “Plato went twisting and turning and tearing to pieces and placing embankments so 
that the volatile and fugacious species should be as it were caught in a net.”33 The 
philosopher is the active ingredient in the creation of attractive bonds: through twisting, 
turning, ripping to shreds and erecting obstacles, Plato manages to cultivate precisely those 
bonds of love which bring reality to knowledge, like iron filings to a magnet. Indeed, in the 
final dialogue of Heroic Frenzies, Bruno idealises the philosopher under the figure of Circe, 
the magician who transformed humans into pigs, who created her own transitions between the 
human and the inhuman. Circe is the conceptual persona of a heroic philosopher able to 
reconstitute bonds at will. Bruno writes, “Oh might it please heaven that in these days, as in 
the past more happy ages, some wise Circe might make herself present who, with plants and 
minerals working her incantations, would be able to curb nature.”34 
 The heroic metaphysician thus turns humans into pigs and pigs into humans; she 
affirms weird, inhuman becomings in the name of knowledge. Humans become gods, 
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minerals and animals—there is no hierarchy here, only assemblages.35 What is more, in 
contrast to Circe, the metaphysician does not merely transform others but primarily herself. 
The metaphysician must in some sense derange herself. The opening to The Ash Wednesday 
Supper insists upon this need for perpetual becomings:  
 
Become heroic and humble; master and disciple; believer and unbeliever; cheerful and 
sad; saturnine and jovial; light and ponderous; miserly and liberal; simian and 
consular; sophist with Aristotle, philosopher with Pythagoras; laugher with 
Democritus and weeper with Heraclitus.
36
 
 
The Nolan universe is one of subjects in motion, transitioning repeatedly from one form to 
another; there is no stability, but “continuous mutation”37; no central archē around which 
motion is anchored.
38
 All that exists is hybrid, destabilised and deranged becoming. 
 And such conscious derangement is done for the sake of the ideal of an omniform 
metaphysics. By means of such successive formations and reformations, “man in all his 
powers displays every species of being”39 and so envelops in herself all of reality. The 
universe is internalised through the power of self-transformation.
 
Therefore, Bruno (as a 
philosopher) himself attempts to cultivate this dynamic heterogeneity. He deranges himself 
and his texts in order to capture the whole. As he puts it in Heroic Frenzies, perfectly 
capturing the knotting together of affect and transformation in his work, “At once I tremble, 
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sparkle, freeze and burn; am mute and fill the air with clamorous plaints.”40 These are the 
“exercises” Bruno refers to in Heroic Frenzies41: exercises which include inducing visions, 
trances, occult experiences and also, we contend, rhetoric. Such exercises are necessary to 
transform the self and envelop reality. Metaphysicians must be “artificers”42, Bruno writes a 
few pages later—and with that sentiment we are back with Deleuze's Letter to a Harsh Critic.  
 
 
Part Three: What Lurks Beneath 
Early in his agenda-setting Freiheitsschrift, Schelling spells out a basic epistemological 
presupposition: 
 
Whoever takes the theory of physics as his point of departure and knows that the 
doctrine of “like is recognised by like” is a very ancient one... such a one will 
understand that the philosopher... alone comprehends the god outside him through the 
god within himself by keeping his mind pure and unclouded by evil.
43
 
 
The subject of knowing must resemble the object of knowing. To remain faithful to this 
injunction is, Schelling adds, “training in philosophy”. Such training is enjoined (both 
explicitly and implicitly) throughout Schelling’s philosophical trajectory: the necessary 
identity of subject and object produces the absolute I of Vom Ich, it makes possible the whole 
metaphysical apparatus of the Identitätssystem and even undergirds the later lectures. What is 
of interest to us here, however, is its metaphilosophical implications: the philosopher must 
become what she would know. Metaphysics is governed by the affect of empathy—an 
                                                 
40
 Bruno, The Heroic Enthusiasts, 40. 
41
 Bruno, The Heroic Enthusiasts, 49. 
42
 Bruno, The Heroic Enthusiasts, 51. 
43
 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom, trans. James Gutmann (La 
Salle: Open Court, 1936), 8. 
16 
 
attractive bond, in Bruno's terminology, which draws the philosopher and her subject matter 
together. 
 What is more, the above passage insists that the metaphysician who engages in such 
practices of identity-formation has a mind “unclouded by evil”. This is certainly true of the 
Platonic metaphysician ascending towards the good; yet, it must be asked, does it ring true of 
the Schellingian philosopher? Indeed, does it ring true of Schelling's own philosophical 
practices in a treatise explicitly orientated towards knowing the possibility and actuality of 
evil? If like is known by like, evil is known by evil—or at least (and this qualification is 
essential) by those who resemble evil. And so it seems incumbent upon Schelling and 
Schellingian philosophers to cultivate a mind clouded by evil (or what resembles evil), rather 
than the reverse. Empathy with evil is a prerequisite for embarking on the metaphysical 
project of the Freiheitsschrift. 
 The contrast with two-world Platonic metaphysics is worth pursuing.
44
 Schellingian 
metaphysics consists in “the solicitation of the depths”45, rather than a flight into the heights. 
It is, moreover, not that such depths should be identified with evil in the way that the heights 
are often equated with the good; rather, for Schelling, to neglect the depths is to impoverish 
reality: it is to fail to comprehend what reality can do, the extent of its productivity. Such is 
the reason Schelling berates all philosophers who have failed to appropriate nature, the unruly 
and all less potentiated phenomena into their systems. A guiding methodological principle 
throughout Schelling's oeuvre can be reconstructed as: what is foreclosed from philosophy 
necessarily weakens it. Such is what Grant dubs “the extensity test”46 and it motivates 
Schelling's violent criticisms of idealising metaphysics: 
 
                                                 
44
 The qualification “two-world” Platonic metaphysics is necessary so as to not obscure Schelling’s affirmation 
of a one-world Platonic physics derived from the Timaeus. See Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature 
after Schelling (London: Continuum, 2006), 26-58. 
45
 Schelling, Inquiries, 79. 
46
 Grant, Philosophies of Nature, 19-21. 
17 
 
Where the ideal principle really operates to a high degree but cannot discover a 
reconciling and mediating basis, it gives birth to a dreary and fanatic enthusiasm 
which breaks forth in self-mutilation or—as in the case of the priests of the Phrygian 
goddess—in self-emasculation, which in philosophy is accomplished by the 
renunciation of reason and science.
47
 
 
At stake therefore in the Schellingian ideal of “reason and science” is an absolute 
metaphysical system in which everything from the unruly depths to the ideal heights is 
enfolded. And, as has already become clear, the cultivation of an affective bond with evil is a 
prerequisite for such absolutisation. 
 In consequence, Schelling positions himself in the same tradition of omniform 
metaphysics as Bruno and Deleuze: the philosophical text must embrace every modality of 
power, every modification of what is. It must repeat reality in all its potencies. Schelling's 
metaphysical practice is therefore one of repetition and the basis of his modus operandi can 
be discerned in the following, 
 
The potencies pass through all the positions and relations to each other which they 
had in the process of nature... The process that repeats itself... is the universal and 
absolute process, and thus the true science of mythology is accordingly the one that 
presents the absolute process in it.
48
 
 
The philosopher is she who repeats, she in whom all the potencies of reality reoccur. The art 
of the metaphysician is the art of total repetition. To construct a system enveloping 
everything, the metaphysician must become like everything. She must cultivate resemblances 
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and carry on repeating. 
 The philosopher must follow reality into depths as well as heights.
49
 Schelling's 
fidelity to this principle is most clearly visible in the natural history sketched towards the end 
of the Freiheitsschrift, where he describes the continual potentiation of reality into ever 
higher and more rarefied regions of being (spirit emerges, then love). However, reality does 
not merely potentiate itself; it also periodically plunges down into the depths—and to think 
otherwise is to be tempted by precisely the ascetic idealism Schelling so violently criticises. 
Thus, the Freiheitsschrift not only narrates the becoming rational of reality, but also its 
diseases, crises and absurdities: 
 
Because the principle of the depths can never give birth for itself to true and 
complete unity, the time comes in which all this glory decays as through 
horrible disease, and finally chaos again ensues.
50
 
 
Such is the significance to Schelling of these concepts of “disease”, “crisis”, “cission” and 
“flood”51: they designate an essential moment of reality. Absolute metaphysics must make 
manifest such essential moments of return to the depths. 
 
 
Part Four: Schelling's Geological Etymology 
One of the problems to which Schelling returns repeatedly is the following: if absolute 
                                                 
49
 The journeying of the philosopher above and below is insisted upon in a 1799 poem (often misdated to 1809) 
in which the philosopher’s heart enjoins her thus, “[You] must try to overleap many rungs / Thereby coveting 
the impossible, / Attain heaven, fired by thirst for the sun,/ Then descend and let loose eternal night. / Dissolving 
the force of unknown magic… / Can be achieved by him who loves these words: / ‘The first ground of 
everlasting evil / Is known by him who joins to the abyss. / The ground of good can only be attained / By him 
who dares climb to the source of light.’” F.W.J. Schelling, Werke, vol. 10, ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart: Cotta, 
1856-61), 447-9; translated by Judith Kahl and Daniel Whistler. 
50
 Schelling, Inquiries, 56. 
51
 On the latter three terms, see Schelling, Inquiries, 57-8. 
19 
 
metaphysics must speak of the depths as well as the heights, how does it do so? That is, the 
depths are precisely that which do not make themselves manifest, but remain hidden beneath 
phenomena. The problem is a geological one: strata of reality lie hidden below phenomena 
and the task of the philosopher is to dig them up. The philosopher becomes a geologist.
52
 
 It is within this problematic that Schelling's philosophy of language is to be situated. 
Schelling's later writing often turns to philology, precisely because language is one of the 
ways in which the depths become manifest as depths. The unruly appears through language—
and so study of language is absolutely key for the formation of an absolute metaphysics. 
Indeed, one of the basic theses of the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology runs: the 
crises and floods that throw the earth into turmoil are repeated in the formation of language. 
Poetry, above all, embodies such disruption: “The crisis through which the world of the gods 
unfolds... is not external to the poets. It takes place in the poets themselves, forms their 
poems.”53 Texts are central to Schelling's work, because they manifest traces of the depths.54 
 Hence, a philosophy that truly intends to include the depths in its system—an absolute 
metaphysics—must pursue (at least some of the time) a geological etymology. As Schelling 
himself puts it, “In the formation of the oldest languages a wealth of philosophy can be 
discovered.”55 Schelling's clearest statement of this project of geological etymology occurs in 
his 1811 Report on Schmid’s Attempt at Pasigraphy: 
 
One may ask whether there are not homologous language formations, like there are 
mountain formations that can recur in quite different places in the world 
independently of each other... When one cognises the physical in language, and 
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pursues and arranges the facts of the history of peoples and language in connection 
with or at least in analogy to the geological, what wondrous and (at present) 
unbelievable regularity and lawfulness will then appear before our eyes!
56
 
 
“Cognising the physical in language” is not merely a matter of recognising the materiality of 
the signifier, but also of thinking the linguistic “in connection with” the geological. Schelling 
establishes a geological model for linguistics based on language's capacity to make present 
the depths. 
The significance of this insight for his philosophical project can be discerned from the 
very procedure of The Deities of Samothrace. Deities takes the names of the gods from the 
Samothracian mystery-cult as sediment to be stripped down, so as to reveal “a primordial 
system older than all written documents, which is the common source of all religious 
doctrines and representations.”57 The unruly depths of reality are, in fact, what is made 
present through this geological-philological operation; for example, the name Axiokersus 
contains the Hebrew root hrs which, in turn, is connected to fire, and, in this way, it manifests 
the Heraclitean truth that “the world is an eternal living fire”.58 The catastrophic unruliness of 
nature is implicitly contained in these names, and to etymologically analyse the names is also 
simultaneously to reveal the workings of reality itself. 
 As Deities shows in practice and the 1811 Report teaches in theory, to become an 
absolute metaphysician requires a focus on language; it requires learning philological 
practices of excavation. An absolute metaphysical text must oscillate perpetually between a 
language of the depths and a language of the heights. To become a metaphysician, one thus 
requires the appropriate rhetorical strategies. Schelling refers to such strategies in The Deities 
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of Samothrace: 
 
Through the consecrations received, the initiate himself became a link of that magical 
chain, himself a Kabir, taken up into the unbreakable relation and joined to the army 
of the higher gods, as the old inscription expresses it. In this sense the Cabiri or their 
servants might well be called inventors of magical singing, as Socrates says the child 
in us must continually be exorcised and must be healed with magical singing until it is 
free of the fear of death.
59
 
 
Both magic and metaphysics
60
 consist in a form of singing that transforms the singer into that 
about which she sings (in this case, a god). To know the gods, one must sing like the gods; 
likewise, to know evil, one must sing “deeply”. Moreover, the key to such linguistic imitation 
is (in part) the practice of magical and occult exercises—as it is for Bruno. Hence, the 1811 
Report describes in detail occult practices by which the true nature of language is revealed. 
The following is an extract from this discussion: 
 
We know of a quantity of cases where people in a somnambulant condition have 
produced poetry which they were never again able to produce in a wakeful state... In 
the Actis Naturae Curiosum there is the story of a woman who in the condition of 
pregnancy fell into an ecstasy in which she sang unknown songs and talked in foreign 
tongues... All this is surely sufficient to prove that the source of language lies in man 
and, like so much else which hides in him, emerges more freely under certain 
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circumstances and is developed into a higher, more universal sense of language.
61
 
 
The extreme affects brought on by illness, frenzy and ecstasy engender the extreme affects of 
language, its heights and its depths.
62
 Once more, metaphysics, affect and rhetoric are knotted 
together. 
 
 
Part Five: Bruno's Affective Pragmatism 
Giordano Bruno's philosophy of language consists for the most part in a critique of grammar. 
Just as Schelling polemicizes against idealists for neglecting the depths and thereby 
emasculating themselves, so too Bruno vehemently criticises grammarians along the same 
lines: 
 
Having grown old... in anatomising phrases and words, [they] have sought to rouse 
the mind to the formation of new logic and metaphysics, judging and sentencing those 
which they had never studied nor understood... They fast, they become thin and 
emaciated, they scourge the skin, and lengthen the beard, they rot... [With] vile 
thoughts they think to mount to the stars, to be equal to gods, and to understand the 
good and the beautiful which philosophy promises.
63
  
 
Linguistic attitudes have physical, ethical and even metaphysical symptoms. What the 
grammarians do wrong, of course, is erect normative models for good language use; they 
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regulate and discipline the way words are employed, prohibiting a deranged use of language. 
“Slaves of definite and determinate sounds and words”64, they establish a priori forms which 
are not context-specific. In contrast, Bruno insists on linguistic pragmatism: a pragmatism 
which does away with all forms of regulation (including linguistic good sense) in the name of 
radical experimentation with rhetorical strategies. He cultivates linguistic disorder.  
 One of the basic differences between the grammarians and Bruno concerns 
signification; in short, Bruno marginalises it. While the grammarians judge language 
according to internal meanings, Bruno places stress on the external effect of words. To 
concentrate on the meaning of words is to limit their potential. Bruno is profoundly 
suspicious of such a move: when one does not determine in advance what language can do, 
language becomes capable of much more—and it is precisely what language does (the effect 
it has in the world) which is at issue. What matters is effect. And the possible effects of 
language are, of course, affective. At this juncture we return once more to the affect-rhetoric-
metaphysics knot: what words do is “cause various effects and passions.”65 This is perhaps 
best exhibited in the very first stanza of the Heroic Frenzies which invokes the Muses as 
those deities who occasion “verses, rhymes and exaltation”66: rhetoric and frenzy are 
assembled into the same list. The Muses inspire a form of language which elevates the 
subject into frenzy, which creates and maintains attractive bonds of love. Hence, Bruno 
concludes a few pages later by explicitly bringing together the linguistic practice of poetry 
and the manipulation of affects: “Enthusiasm is born, by ploughing the field of the Muses and 
scattering the seed of his thoughts and waiting for the fruitful harvest, discovering in himself 
the fervour of the affections.”67 Rhetoric is an optimal strategy for the creation of those bonds 
by which the world is disclosed to the subject; it is therefore a crucial tool for both the 
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magician and (what is almost the same thing) the metaphysician. 
 There is no rhetoric which is a priori effective (or affective); rather, language must be 
experimented with; it must be deranged, upended and reconstructed. Hence, Bruno's own 
rhetorical project consists in the pragmatic reconfiguration of philosophical discourse: it is 
why his texts are such unique assemblages of satire, dialogue, doctrine and nonsense. The 
pedant, Prudenzio, might cry out, “It seems to me you take little account of words”68, but 
Bruno revels in his eclecticism: 
 
[The Ash Wednesday Supper does] not appear to constitute a single topic, but 
appear[s] here like a dialogue, here a comedy, here a tragedy, here poetry and here 
rhetoric, here praise, here vituperation, here demonstration and teaching; here we have 
now natural philosophy, now mathematics, now morals, now logic; in conclusion, 
there is no sort of knowledge of which there is not here some fragment.
69
 
 
Bruno is as innovative rhetorically as he is metaphysically—and for exactly the same reasons. 
The philosophical text is a site of pragmatic experimentation, just as the subject is the site of 
myriad becomings. Bruno's metaphysical language is just as subject to the practice of 
“pantomorphosis”70 and the ideal of omniformis as is his universe. 
 
 
Part Six: Deploying the Physics of Sense 
For Deleuze (if for a moment we just concentrate on The Logic of Sense), the primary goal of 
the metaphysician has now become the capacity to “stretch our skin like a drum”71—the 
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capacity to create spaces in which multiplicities of meanings can be re-engendered. The 
problem is not, as with Schelling, how to plumb depths, or, with Bruno, how to contain 
worlds in oneself, but rather how to create diagrammatic lines of flight. Proliferation becomes 
the act of piety and, in turn, piety becomes attention to how to allow as many hybrids and 
mutations as possible to proliferate. But the “as possible” has no measure; the virtual is 
infinitely fecund. 
 Nevertheless, continuities with Bruno and Schelling are legion. Bruno's stress on 
pragmatics is of course repeated in A Thousand Plateaus, in which Deleuze and Guattari 
repeatedly flag up “the necessity of a return to pragmatics”.72 Indeed, pragmatics must be, 
they claim, the central, orienting plank of any theory of language; it is “the presupposition 
behind all of the other dimensions and insinuates itself into everything.”73 Moreover, 
pragmatics is closely linked—as in Bruno—to the idea of becoming-animal and magic. In 
“Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible”, which Kerslake has 
dubbed “a late modern occult treatise”74, Deleuze and Guattari write that the pragmatic 
utilisation of multiplicities is, in fact, the very definition of sorcery.
75
 Magic, the occult and a 
pragmatic linguistics once again form a nodal point around which the thought of Deleuze, 
like that of Bruno and Schelling, revolves. 
 Moreover, it is not just in A Thousand Plateaus that such a pragmatic rhetoric is 
espoused. Anti-Oedipus is equally committed to it. Here too language works, rather than 
means: what matters is what it does and the effects it has, rather than what it represents.
76
 
Language, Deleuze and Guattari write, “should not be conceived of in terms of 
representation; it refers instead to the class of ‘effects’: effects that are not a mere dependence 
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on causes, but the occupation of a domain, and the operation of a system of signs.”77 In order 
to realise this ideal, Deleuze and Guattari write about (and, importantly for our purposes, also 
produce) “a stream of words that do not let themselves be coded, a libido that is too fluid, too 
viscous: non-sense erected as a flow, polyvocity that returns to haunt all relations.”78 
Language takes place on a plane of immanence alongside all other forces—and because it is 
the force most proximate to both the philosopher and the psychoanalyst it takes up a 
privileged position in their work. 
 The metaphilosophical significance of this conception of language is what is key to 
the argument of this paper—and perhaps the best way to bring it out is through a reading of 
the Eighteenth Series of The Logic of Sense, “The Three Images of the Philosopher”. Deleuze 
here distinguishes between Platonic heights, Nietzschean depths and Stoic surfaces in a way 
that repeats much of the rhythm of a magical metaphysics, ascending and descending across 
that threshold by which thought becomes human. 
 Thus, on the one hand, in Platonism, “the philosopher is a being of ascents; he is the 
one who leaves the cave and rises up”79, whilst, on the other hand, “the pre-Socratics placed 
thought inside the caverns and life in the deep... [and so recognised] the absolute depth dug 
out in bodies and in thought.”80 To return to an earlier argument, such is the duality by which 
Schelling measures the extensity of his metaphysics: to be able to be both Platonist and pre-
Socratic. However, Deleuze adds a third orientation which appears in Stoic and Cynic 
thought:  
 
This is a reorientation of all thought and of what it means to think: there is no longer 
depth or height. The Cynical and Stoic sneers against Plato are many. It is always a 
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matter of unseating the Ideas, of showing that the incorporeal is not high above, but is 
rather at the surface.
81
  
 
He continues,  
 
The autonomy of the surface, independent of, and against depth and height; the 
discovery of incorporeal events, meanings, or effects, which are irreducible to “deep” 
bodies and to “lofty” ideas—these are the important Stoic discoveries against the pre-
Socratics and Plato.
82
 
  
 This surface is that on which sense occurs as an effect. Meanings “frolic on the 
surface of being, and constitute an endless multiplicity of incorporeal beings.”83 Such is what 
the Stoics found. In consequence, each philosophical text is envisaged as a surface on which 
sense is produced—“a machine for the production of incorporeal sense.”84 As Deleuze makes 
clear, different texts chart different surface effects: each philosophical singularity is generated 
from specific operations on the textual surface. Hence, The Logic of Sense is devoted to the 
description of a specific set of surface operations employed by certain philosophers which he 
dubs, the “Carroll effect”: 
 
Sense is always an effect. . . or, even better, a surface effect, a position effect and a 
language effect. . . It is a product which spreads out over, or extends itself the length 
of, the surface. . . Such effects, or such a product, have usually been designated by a 
proper and singular name. . . Thus physics speaks of the “Kelvin effect”, of the 
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“Seebeck effect”, of the “Zeerman effect”, etc.85 
 
The specific set of operations of the Carroll effect consists in paradoxes which give rise to 
heterogeneous series. 
 What are we to make of the Eighteenth Series in this regard? Were Plato and the pre-
Socratics wrong to affirm the heights and depths respectively? This surely cannot be 
Deleuze's point: not only because the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project takes up once 
more the Nietzschean project of sounding out the depths, but also because the “final task” of 
The Logic of Sense itself consists in “the history of depths.”86 It would therefore be odd to 
read philosophies of depth (and philosophies of height) as falsifications of the surface on 
which sense occurs. Rather, they are perversions in the very technical sense Deleuze gives 
this term at the end of the Eighteenth Series: “Perversion implies an extraordinary art of 
surfaces.”87 A footnote to an earlier passage provides a gloss on this definition: for Nietzsche, 
Deleuze insists, “Height is but a mystification, a surface effect.”88 In other words, height and 
(presumably) depth are effects produced on the surface of sense; they are perversions and, as 
such, specific ways in which philosophers have configured surface effects. The innovative art 
of each new philosopher gives rise to a new idea of sense, to a new effect (the Plato-effect, 
the Empedocles-effect in analogy to the Kelvin-effect and the Seebeck-effect). The 
conjunctions and disjunctions that litter the surface of sense are rearranged. When Bruno 
speaks of Plato “twisting and turning and tearing to pieces and placing embankments so that 
the volatile and fugacious species should be as it were caught in a net”, Deleuze similarly 
speaks of the Plato-event as a redeployment of sense. 
 In short, to trace each of these deployments of sense which give rise to images of 
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philosophy is to embark on a “physics of sense”. It is to understand philosophy in terms of its 
rhetorical productivity: to explicate the Plato-effect and the Nietzsche-effect alongside the 
Carroll-effect. And this is precisely what we have been embarking on in this paper: not just a 
redescription of the theory of a physics of sense, but a performance of such a physics itself. 
What has been at issue is the genealogy of the Deleuze-effect. [**For a further example of 
this kind of analysis, see Daniel Whistler, “Improper Names for God: Religious Language 
and the ‘Spinoza Effect’,” Speculations 3 (2012 forthcoming).] 
<break> 
 What, then, does this mean for the philosopher? What is at stake—affectively, 
ethically, physically—in the perversion of sense?   In a strange and unexpected way, we 
return here to Vico’s giants:  for Deleuze in The Logic of Sense, what is at stake in the 
polymorphous production of sense is a question of divination—divination as the art of the 
metaphysician. In The Logic of Sense, the moral problem of the Stoic sage is how to become 
the quasi-cause of the incorporeal event.
89
 To oversimplify, this is a matter of selective 
interpretation: one selects the most limited possible present within which to entertain a 
maximum of sense (and nonsense). The inclusion of nonsense is highly precise, and 
theatrical:  Deleuze indicates that it is the mime that gives us the clearest image of what to do. 
The mime does not imitate a specific gesture (walking, climbing, eating) as performed by 
someone in particular, but selectively presents Walking, Climbing, Eating as if they were a 
pure, “incorporeal” medium in which the body operates. What the mime does, effectively, is 
allow the mind to focus. This is no small achievement, since in principle there is an infinity of 
sense, or at least an unlimited dimension of sense (and non-sense) within every event. 
Metaphysics is immediately ethical, from this perspective, in the sense that metaphysical 
discourse is not an attempt to comprehensively describe being as such, but to limit the 
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potential overflow or superabundance of sense and nonsense in a particular way—namely, in 
a way that is productive of a specific configuration of surface effects. The metaphysician 
thereby identifies with sense or, more accurately, with the aleatory aspect of sense: 
 
The Stoic sage “identifies” with the quasi-cause, sets up shop at the surface, on the 
straight line which traverses it, or at the aleatory point which traces or travels this line. 
The sage is like the [Zen] archer. . . the bowman must reach the point where the aim is 
not the aim, that is to say, the bowman himself; where the arrow flies over its straight 
line while creating its own target; where the surface of the target is also the line and 
the point, the bowman, the shooting of the arrow, and what is shot at.
90
 
  
 The problem from this point of view, of course, is that it can appear as if the sage is in 
fact completely determined by physical causes—not actively identifying with the “quasi-
cause” of sense itself, but rather wholly determined by physical causation, in the depths of 
bodies. But there is for Deleuze, as for the Stoics, a freedom proper to a certain usage of 
representation itself: “representation and its usage intervene at this point.”91 At what point? At 
the point of the “most limited possible present.”92 Here one somehow is incorporeally 
incorporated (Deleuze speaks of the birth of the sage as a kind of “immaculate conception”) 
by the very difference between two kinds of time, Aiôn and Chronos.
93
 What one does once 
one achieves this state is literally beside the point, since the whole point, ethically speaking, 
is to occupy the instant and prevent it from overflowing. Divination is not a matter of 
selecting among possible meanings, possible senses, but grasping sense itself as the 
possibility of any continuity, any survival, any sustainable surface that can escape the warring 
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determinations of the depths.  
 Hence, we attain to a version of absolute knowledge, and metaphysics becomes ethics 
as divination. The physics of sense names the selective and transforming power of a word 
that has become adequate to a present moment, an instant which that word alone can grasp. 
We can now appreciate Deleuze’s question, “How could the event be grasped and willed 
without its being referred to the corporeal cause from which it results, and through this cause, 
to the unity of causes as Physics?”94—and, as we have argued in this section, this is a 
question about the status of metaphysics as much as of ethics. 
 
Here divination grounds ethics. In fact, the divinatory interpretation consists of the 
relation between the pure event (not yet actualized) and the depth of bodies, the 
corporeal action and passions whence it results. We can state precisely how this 
interpretation proceeds: it is always a question of cutting into the thickness, of carving 
out surfaces, of orienting them, of increasing and multiplying them in order to follow 
out the tracing of lines and incisions inscribed on them. Thus, the sky is divided into 
sections and a bird’s line of light is distributed according to them; we follow on the 
ground the letter traced by a pig’s snout; the liver is drawn up to the surface where its 
lines and fissures are observed. Divination is, in the most general sense, the art of 
surfaces, lines and singular points appearing at the surface. This is why two fortune-
tellers cannot regard one another without laughing, a laughter which is humorous.
95
 
 
Can two metaphysicians regard one another without laughter? Let alone our three—Bruno, 
Schelling and Deleuze? We would hope so! If laughter is humor, and humor is the essence of 
health, then Vico was right to discern the becoming-human of the giants in a poetic 
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metaphysics of divination.  Vico was right again, in the face of looming catastrophe during 
the nadir of civilizations, to continuously remind humanity of its initial divinatory emergence, 
its becoming-pious. This re-emergence is simultaneously poetic, metaphysical, and religious, 
such that it binds heaven and earth—sense and nonsense?—to avoid being overwhelmed by 
chaos. In this sense metaphysics has nothing to do with an after-thought of life, but names 
human survival, as such. 
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